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ST. RITA'S AND LOST CAUSES: IMPROVING
NURSING HOME EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Robert A. Mead*
INTRODUCTION
Early in the morning on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina
made landfall, passing slightly east of New Orleans, Louisiana
as a Category Four storm with torrential rain and winds over
130 miles per hour.' The storm caused fifteen to twenty-three
foot storm surges off of Lake Ponchartrain. 2  The initial
celebration that New Orleans did not receive a direct hit from
the storm was quickly replaced by panic and mayhem when the
levees that protect low-lying New Orleans from the higher
waters of Lake Ponchartrain and the Mississippi River began to
fail, flooding roughly eighty percent of the city under as much as
twenty feet of water.3 Although the images of trapped residents
and dead bodies are fresh in the nation's memory, city officials
estimate that approximately eighty percent of the population
had complied with evacuation orders and escaped.4
Nevertheless, as of December 9, 2005, state officials had
recovered nearly 1,100 bodies of people killed by the storm and
* Robert A. Mead, J.D., M.L.S., is the Head of Public and Faculty Services at
the University of Kansas School of Law's Wheat Law Library where he
teaches the research methodology course in the Elder Law LL.M. program.
He is a graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law and the
Emporia State University School of Library and Information Management.
1. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Hurricane Season 2005: Katrina,
Oct. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingatearth/h2005_katrina.html.
2. Joseph B. Treaster and Kate Zernike, Hurricane Katrina: The Overview; Hurricane
Slams into the Gulf Coast; Dozens are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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subsequent flooding.' Over sixty percent of the deceased were at
least sixty-one years old, and at least 215 of the bodies were
found in or around nursing homes and hospitals.6 Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals' spokesman, Bob
Johannessen, explained that the "elderly were much more likely
to be in hospitals and nursing homes as well as possibly
homebound and not able to access transportation in order to
evacuate from the storm."7
One group of elderly Katrina victims was found in St. Rita's
Nursing Home, in Violet, an incorporated community located in
St. Bernard Parish, a suburban area southeast of New Orleans.
State and local officials have concluded that thirty-four residents
of the nursing home were killed by rapidly rising flood waters.'
On September 13, 2005, the Louisiana Attorney General, Charles
C. Foti, Jr. and parish officials brought thirty-four counts of
negligent homicide against each of the owners of St. Rita's,
Mabel Mangano and Salvador Mangano Sr., because of their
failure to comply with mandatory evacuation orders and their
facility's own emergency response plan.9 State and local officials
are continuing their investigation of the tragedy while the
Manganos prepare their legal defense.
Fittingly, St. Rita is revered as the patron saint of lost or
impossible causes. 10 The massive impact of Hurricane Katrina
on the elderly residents of New Orleans and surrounding areas
5. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, News Release: Deceased Katrina
Victims Released to Families 12-9-2005, Dec. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.dhh.state.la.us/news.asp?Detail=758.
6. Most Katrina Victims Were Elderly, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 24, 2005, at A5.
7. Id
8. Body is Thought to be Nursing Home Patient's, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 6, 2005, at
7. At the time of arrest, only thirty-four bodies had been found. The suspected thirty-fifth
victim of the St. Rita's tragedy was found on October 1, 2005, behind the facility in a
wooded area. Although it is not definite that the body came from St. Rita's, the storm
victim still had a feeding tube inserted in her body. To date, there has not been an additional
negligent homicide charge brought against the Manganos.
9. Charles C. Foti, Jr., Office of Attorney General, State of Louisiana, Press Release:
Nursing Home Owners Surrender to Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Investigators (Sept. 14,
2005), available at http://www.ag.state.1a.us/ViewPressRel.aspx?ReIID-420.
10. Office of Papal Liturgical Celebrations, Vatican, Saints and Blessed, available at
http://www.vatican.va.
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forces the critical question of whether existing evacuation and
facility safety policies are reasonably sufficient to protect the
lives of residents of nursing homes. This article contends that
the current regulatory scheme for both nursing home safety
design and evacuation planning makes safety during natural
disasters an impossible cause that demands rectification. The
first section of this article examines recent nursing home
tragedies caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Examples of
resident deaths caused by both non-evacuation and problematic
evacuation are documented as case studies that highlight the
dilemma currently faced by nursing home administrators when
natural disasters are predicted. The second section details the
perfunctory nature of the federal regulations requiring nursing
homes to develop emergency preparedness and evacuation
plans. Louisiana's revised nursing home licensure regulations
regarding emergency preparedness are highlighted in
comparison to the federal regulations. The third section
analyzes the failure of state legislatures to hold the nursing
home industry accountable to higher emergency preparedness
standards. The weaknesses of current regulatory requirements
are exacerbated by the power of the nursing home lobby to limit
state statutory efforts to tighten safety requirements, as shown
by the legislative process in Florida and Louisiana. The fourth
section focuses on judicial alternatives to strengthened
regulation through the pursuit of tort and criminal lawsuits.
The upcoming prosecution of Salvador and Mabel Mangano for
negligent homicide is considered as a potential bell-weather
case. The final section consists of recommendations for
strengthened federal regulations governing nursing home
emergency preparedness. This article concludes with the
assertion that regulation, rather than legislative or judicial
alternatives, provides the superior vehicle for keeping the
nation's nursing home residents as safe as possible during
natural disasters.
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RECENT NURSING HOME EVACUATION TRAGEDIES
Residents of nursing homes are frail, disabled, and usually
elderly."1 The fact that they are residents of a nursing home
typically indicates that they are unable to care for themselves
and need the assistance of nursing staff for many basic self-care
tasks.12 This inability to care for themselves is compounded in
natural disasters, where the elderly are most likely to suffer the
impacts." In addition to hurricanes, other natural disasters that
can affect nursing home residents are floods, 14 wildfires,15
tornadoes, 6 earthquakes,' 7 blizzards and ice storms,18 and
periods of extreme heat.19 All natural disasters are potentially
11. Marshall B. Kapp, Resident Safety and Medical Errors in Nursing Homes:
Reporting and Disclosure in a Culture ofMutual Distrust, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 53 (2003).
12. Id.
13. U.S. Admin. on Aging and the Kansas Dep't on Aging, Emergency Preparedness
Manual for the Aging Network 1 (1995), at 5.
14. Forty-seven residents of a nursing home in Ada, Minnesota were evacuated when
the town flooded in 1997. Within seven months, fifteen of the evacuees had died of natural
causes, complicated by the stress, loneliness, and despair caused by the evacuation.
WILLIAM ORIOL, PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES FOR OLDER ADULTS IN DISASTERS 27 (1999).
15. In the 1998 Florida wildfires, three nursing home residents died during evacuation.
Courage Under Florida's Fires, PALM BEACH POST, July 12, 1998, at lE.
16. On May 30, 2004, a tornado destroyed the Friendship Healthcare Nursing Home
near Indianapolis, Indiana, with little warning. Although no one was directly killed by the
tornado itself, the damage forced the fifty-one residents to move to another nursing home for
over a year, causing transfer trauma, potentially exacerbating the illnesses that caused the
death of nineteen of the residents during the following year. Will Higgins, Nursing Home
Recovers from '04 Tornado, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 17, 2005.
17. The January 17, 1994 Northridge, California earthquake forced a pre-dawn
evacuation of residents of the Simi Valley Rehabilitation and Nursing Center to a local
hospital because the earthquake opened a crack through the building. Betty Kwong,
Hospital Makes Room for Seniors, DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1994, at 1.
18. A West Virginia nursing home was evacuated after a winter storm knocked out
electricity and dropped the temperatures to an eleven-degree low. W. Va. Wind Chill 20
Below Zero, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 4, 1999, at lA.
19. Two patients died in the SunBridge Care & Rehabilitation Nursing Home in
Burlingame, California, in a June 2000 heat wave when temperatures reached 108 degrees
on the second floor of the building which did not have air conditioning. Nancy Weaver
Teichert, Nursing Home Chain Told to Make Upgrades, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 5, 2001;
See also Eric Klinenberg, HEAT WAVE: A SOCIAL AUTOPSY OF DISASTER IN CHICAGO
(2002) (detailing the deaths of over 700, mostly elderly, victims of the 1995 Chicago heat
wave).
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lethal and grounds for a presidential, state, or local disaster
declaration. 20 Fire safety equipment and procedures are also a
critical element of nursing home emergency preparedness
plans.21 Non-natural disasters, including industrial chemical
accidents and acts of terrorism, are also threats to the lives and
safety of nursing home residents and need to be included in
facility emergency preparedness plans, 22 but they are beyond the
scope of this article.23
Emergency preparedness strategies for nursing home
residents are complicated by the fact that elders often die or are
20. A FEMA map showing a national distribution of the 1,198 Presidential Disaster
Declarations between December 24, 1964 and January 12, 1998. It shows heavy
concentration of disasters along in California, Washington, Louisiana, Florida, Oklahoma,
North Dakota, Minnesota, Kentucky, Hawaii, Virginia, Maine, Massachusetts, and scattered
pockets throughout tornado country. Over fifty percent of these declarations have been due
to flooding with another approximately twenty percent attributable to tornados. FEMA,
Historical Presidential Disaster Declarations (May 23, 2005), available at
http://www.fema.gov/graphics/library/dd- 1 964.gif.
21. Over one-half of the nation's 16,000 nursing homes are in violation of fire safety
standards each year. Peter Eisler, Fire Risks Threaten Assisted Living, USA TODAY, Dec.
16-18, 2005, at IA. Sprinklers are not now required under the federal regulations. Reta A.
Underwood, Survey Survival: Don't Fool with Mother Nature, 54 NURSING HOMES 66
(Nov. 2005). This contributes to tragedies such as the two deaths on December 12, 2005, at
the Mather Nursing Center in Ishpeming, Michigan. The State Police Fire Investigator, Jeff
Hubbard, explained that "[i]f there would have been a sprinkler system in the room, I'm sure
it could have helped, but it's not required." Pete Mackin & Steve Brownlee, Police Mum on
Fire Probe: Report Due Thursday on Cause, MINING J., Dec. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.miningjournal.net/news/story/1214202005 new02-nl214.asp. Alison Hirschel,
of the Michigan Campaign for Quality Care, notes, "ninety-two percent of Michigan nursing
homes were cited for fire safety violations during the latest inspection" and she finds it
"shocking and unconscionable that almost two-thirds of our frail, vulnerable nursing home
population live in facilities that cannot adequately protect them in case of fire and that
virtually all nursing homes violate some fire safety requirements." Alison Hirschel, State
Nursing Homes Need Safety Upgrade, LANSING STATE J., Dec. 15, 2005, at 11 A.
22. See Ute J. Dymon & Robert Schwartz, Nursing Home Evacuation Plans: Myth or
Reality; The Greater Cleveland Area as a Case Study, 2002 J. OF THE AM. SOC. OF PROF.
EMERGENCY PLANNERS 97, 103 (2002) (finding that although sixty percent of twenty-five
randomly selected nursing homes in Cuyahoga County, Ohio were within one mile of a
hazardous chemical storage facility only eight percent of the administrators who responded
to the study's survey were aware of such facilities).
23. Non-natural disasters, whether intentional or unintentional, are much more
complicated to plan for and require even greater coordination with local and national
authorities. JAMES T. TWEEDY, HEALTHCARE HAZARD CONTROL AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT 133 (1997). One study found that about one-half of the nursing home
evacuations in the 1980s were related to weather, with hurricanes being the most common
cause to evacuate. BARBARA M. VOGT, EVACUATION OF INSTITUTIONALIZED AND SPECIAL
POPULATIONS (1990).
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injured during evacuations. Increased frailty can cause "transfer
trauma," which exacerbates illnesses and can even cause death. 24
For example, in the 1997 Ada, Minnesota flood, of forty-seven
residents evacuated from a nursing home, fifteen were dead
within seven months of being transferred. 25  Charlie Hicks, the
nursing home's director, explained, "[t]he stress of being
uprooted in the middle of the night and deposited in places far
from their families has simply been too much for many of the
old people weakened by age and disease." 26 Transfer trauma
may exacerbate the psychiatric and behavioral conditions
affecting over an estimated ninety percent of nursing home
residents.2 7 The most potentially lethal transfers are those where
a facility is shut down or its residents are otherwise dispersed,
causing a "serious deterioration in the support system." 28
Although it would be unethical to construct a valid scientific
study to prove the point, emergency evacuations on unsafe
buses in sweltering conditions where friends from the nursing
home are dying in transit is likely to exponentially increase
transfer trauma. Cohort studies of the effects of evacuation on
residents who survived Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would
provide a badly needed understanding of both the
vulnerabilities and resiliencies of nursing home residents who
were transferred. Transfer trauma can be mitigated by care
providers who help to reestablish routines and reconnect ties
with caregivers, friends, and family.29
24. U.S. Admin. on Aging and the Kansas Dep't on Aging, supra note 13, at 5. See
also H.R. REP. No. 106-44, at 3 (1999) ("According to a Feb. 8, 1999 letter to Health and
Environment Subcommittee Chairman Michael Bilirakis in support of H.R. 540 from Geme
G. Hernandez, Florida Secretary of Elder Affairs, 'The evidence is overwhelming that,
without extraordinary preparatory efforts that are hardly ever made, any move is harmful for
the preponderance of the frail elderly; the technical term is 'transfer trauma."').
25. ORIOL, supra note 14, at 27.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id
28. Terri D. Kellive, Studies of Transfer Trauma in Nursing Home Patients: How the
Legal System Has Failed to See the Whole Picture, 3 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF LAW-
MEDICINE 421, 439 (1993) (citing Thomas L. Coffman, Relocation and Survival of
Institutionalized Aged: A Re-examination of the Evidence, 21 GERONTOLOGIST 483, 492
(1981)).
29. Elizabeth Fried Ellen, The Elderly May Have Advantage in Natural Disaster, 18
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ST. RITA'S NURSING HOME AND THE FAILURE TO EVACUATE
The disputed facts regarding what happened on August 28
and 29, 2005, at St. Rita's Nursing Home are beginning to
emerge sufficiently enough to highlight critical issues regarding
the evacuation of nursing homes. Nevertheless, the advocates in
the criminal and tort cases are busily coloring the facts in the
press in preparation for trial.30 In order to provide the broadest
and fairest view, this article includes information from defense
counsel, reporters' descriptions, as well as quotations from local
and state authorities and prosecutors.
St. Rita's Nursing Home, a one-story brick facility, sits in an
area of comparative high ground in the low-lying region
southeast of New Orleans in St. Bernard's Parish that had not
flooded prior to Hurricane Katrina, even during Hurricane Betsy
in 1965.31 It is owned and operated by Salvador and Mabel
Mangano.32 The facility was home to approximately seventy
residents,33 including at least five "special needs" residents who
needed to be transferred in ambulances to an evacuation facility
with appropriate medical capabilities.M St. Rita's Nursing Home
had an average safety record, with no deaths related to
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Jan. 2001).
30. E.g., Scarborough Country, Scarborough Country: Nursing Home 'Misjudgment'
(MSNBC Oct. 17, 2005) available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9728359/from/RL.4
(interview of James Cobb, attorney for the Manganos).
31. Paul Rioux, Attorney: Arrested Nursing Home Operators are Heroes, Times-
Picayune, Sep. 14, 2005, at 99 [hereinafter Operators are Heros]. Newsnight: President
Bush Accepts Responsibility For Katrina Failures; Controversy Over Gathering of the Dead
in New Orleans; Did Racism Effect the Governments Response to Hurricane Katrina?
(CNN television broadcast Sept. 13, 2005) available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/13/asb.01.html [hereinafter Newsnight]
(quoting Dr. Bryan Bertucci saying "one of the owners, Mable [sic] Mangano, was betting
on her experience that this nursing home was on high ground, had never flooded, and that
New Orleans had been spared before."); Laura Parker, What really happened at St. Rita's?
Dozens of residents died when Katrina's storm surge flooded a nursing home. Now,
emerging details are shedding light on the tragedy - and even debunking afew myths, USA
TODAY, Nov. 29, 2005, at IA.
32. Foti, supra note 9.
33. Paul Rioux, Doomed Nursing Home Had Offer of Bus Transport; Coroner says
Owner Snubbed Help Until it was Too Late, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 9, 2005, at A2
[hereinafter Offer ofBus].
34. Newsnight, supra note 31 (quoting Dr. Bryan Bertucci).
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substandard care, as well as a reputation for being a fairly good
facility."
As Hurricane Katrina approached southeastern Louisiana,
having been down-graded from a Category Five to a Category
Four hurricane, a number of parishes ordered the mandatory
evacuation of residents. 6 An August 28, 2005, a news release
from the Louisiana State Patrol regarding mandatory evacuation
categorized St. Bernard Parish's evacuation as mandatory, but
also noted that the parish had made a "strong recommendation
of evacuation."" Somewhat earlier, on Saturday, August 27,
2005, the New Orleans Times-Picayune website quoted St. Bernard
Parish Emergency Management Director, Larry Ingargiola, as
saying that the parish had "recommended that all residents
evacuate, though it likely will not declare a mandatory
evacuation because the parish won't offer shelters."38 Whether
and when St. Bernard's Parish ordered a mandatory evacuation
of the parish is likely to be a key issue in the Manganos'
negligent homicide prosecution.
St. Rita's Nursing Home had an evacuation plan on file with
St. Bernard Parish.39 Dr. Bryan Bertucci, the parish coroner,
explained, "[a]ll of our nursing homes have evacuation plans to
begin getting their residents to safety 72 hours before a
hurricane is expected to make landfall. There may have been
some extenuating circumstances that kept St. Rita's from
executing their plan."# The other nursing homes in St. Bernard
35. Id. (quoting Dr. Bryan Bertucci: "This was a very good home, provided very good
care. The owners are very conscientious toward the patients.").
36. Louisiana State Police News Release, Southeast Louisiana Evacuations Continue,
Aug. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.1sp.org/1spnewsr.nsfl0/d6c3592c31 ddbee38625706b003e600d?OpenDocument.
37. Id. Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at 1 (The
Times-Picayune lists St. Bernard Parish as having ordered an evacuation by the mid-
afternoon of Sunday, August 28, 2005.).
38. Katrina Evacuation Directives, TIMES-PICAYUNE WEB EDmON, Aug. 27, 2005,
available at http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf7/mtlogs/nolaTimes-
Picayune/archives/2005_08_27.html.
39. Rioux, Offer of Bus, supra note 33.
40. Id.
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Parish successfully evacuated their patients.41 Larry Ingargiola
explained that St. Rita's plan was to "be out 72 to 48 hours" prior
to when a hurricane was forecast to hit.42
A second critical question of fact in the St. Rita's
prosecution will be whether St. Bernard Parish officials
appropriately alerted St. Rita's staff of the mandatory
evacuation. Dr. Bryan Bertucci, the parish coroner, has publicly
stated that he called Mabel Mangano about 2:00 p.m. on August
28, 2005, to urge her to accept evacuation assistance, asserting
that "I told her I had two buses and two drivers who could
evacuate all seventy of her residents and take them anywhere
she wanted to go."43 According to Dr. Bertucci, she declined the
assistance, allegedly stating, "I have five nurses and a generator,
and we're going to stay here."" Dr. Bertucci has expressed the
opinion that Mabel Mangano had decided to stay prior to his
call, perhaps because ambulances were unavailable to evacuate
her special care patients to the Superdome. 45 She reportedly
changed her mind two hours later and called to see if the buses
were still available. 46 Unfortunately, by that point, it was too
late to evacuate, 47 according to Dr. Bertucci, "[tihey all could
have been stuck on a highway in buses in the middle of a
hurricane. It might have been an even worse tragedy than
this."" The Manganos' attorney, James Cobb, disputes Dr.
Bertucci's alleged offer of patient evacuation buses prior to the
storm.49 He also disputes that parish officials alerted the
4 1. Id.
42. Greg Miller & Ellen Barry, Nursing Home Gambled; Residents Paid the Price,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE ONLINE EDITION, Sept. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-
0509140204sep 14,1,7650307.story?coll=chi-newsspecials-hed.
43. Rioux, Offer ofBus, supra note 33.
44. Id. See also Newsnight, supra note 31 (quoting Dr. Bertucci as stating Mabel
Mangano said, "I have five nurses. I have a generator, and I have spoken to the families, and
they said it was OK to stay.").
45. Newsnight, supra note 31.
46. Rioux Offer of Bus, supra note 33.
47. The outer bands of Hurricane Katrina hit St. Rita's starting about 7:30 p.m. on
August 28,2005. Id.
48. Rioux, Offer ofBus, supra note 33.
49. Rioux, Operators are Heros, supra note 31.
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Manganos of the mandatory evacuation. 0
After the storm passed on the morning of Monday, August
29, 2005, Salvador Mangano and several others stepped outside
to inspect the grounds.5' They reported hearing a rumbling
sound and saw a wall of water coming towards them.52 They
rushed back inside the facility and attempted to barricade the
doors and windows. 3 Over the next twenty to thirty minutes,
thirty-four residents drowned in the incoming water as the
water filled the rooms from floor to ceiling." Contrary to some
early media reports, the Manganos did not abandon their
residents during the flooding, but instead stayed to work with
their staff, fire-fighters, and neighbors to save as many residents
as they could.5 Also contrary to early reports, none of the
victims were found strapped to their beds or wheelchairs. 56
The Manganos assert that broken levees, rather then their
failure to evacuate, caused the deaths at St. Rita's.57  The
Manganos' attorney, James Cobb, characterizes their behavior
after the storm as heroic, noting that they stayed at the facility in
50. Live From: Ophelia Strikes Outer Banks; Pumps Continue to Dry Out New
Orleans; Bombings Kill Nearly 150 in Baghdad; Bush Asks UN for Unity on Poverty,
Terrorism (CNN Sept. 14, 2005) available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/14/lol.02.html (James Cobb is quoted as
saying, "Our view is that we absolutely had an evacuation plan. That plan was of record
with the Department of Health and Hospitals. It was of record with St. Bernard Parish. That
plan - they had it."). When asked by host, Paula Zahn, why they didn't execute the plan,
Mr. Cobb answered
Ma'am? They did execute it. They sat and waited for a mandatory evacuation
order from the officials at St. Bernard Parish. It never came. I just heard Dr. Patusi
... indicate that he called them and told them to evacuate. That is not the
recollection of everybody at the nursing home. And they were in the facility, not
someplace else. Id.
51. Parker, supra note 31.
5 2. Id.
53. Id.
54. When Care Means Evacuating, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 20, 2005, at B6.
55. Paul Rioux, Owners Booked in 34 Deaths at St. Bernard Nursing Home, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al. See also Parker, supra note 31.
56. Id.
57. Rioux, Operators are Heros, supra note 31 (the argument that the federal
government's failure to erect and maintain adequate levees is more to blame for the deaths
caused by Hurricane Katrina than failure to evacuate is not isolated to nursing home cases).
See Jarvis DeBerry, We Needed Levees, Not More Buses, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 16, 2005,
at 7.
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order to help save fifty-two people, including residents, staffers,
and their families. 8He also explained that their decision not to
evacuate was affected by their concern that the evacuation could
harm or kill more residents than the storm. 9
The whereabouts of Salvador and Mabel Mangano during
the two week period after August 29, 2005, are unclear, although
in the chaos of the evacuation, this also was true of many Gulf
Coast residents. On September 8, 2005, Louisiana Attorney
General, Charels C. Foti, Jr., announced that his Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit was investigating an estimated thirty-two deaths at
St. Rita's Nursing Home and was looking for the Manganos and
any other witnesses.6 0 On September 13, Salvador and Mabel
Mangano voluntarily surrendered to the Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit investigators 61 and were each charged with thirty-
four counts of negligent homicide.62 In response to their arrest,
the Manganos' attorney argued "[i]t's ridiculous to arrest these
two people considering the problems with the evacuation at all
levels of the government."6 3
Other Louisiana nursing homes also decided not to
evacuate their residents. As of October, 2005, Louisiana
Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr. had instigated criminal
investigations against thirteen nursing homes and six hospitals
for failure to evacuate patients." According to a list compiled by
the Louisiana Nursing Homes Association, of the approximately
sixty nursing homes affected by Katrina, only twenty-one
evacuated before the storm.6" In Orleans and Jefferson Parishes,
58. Rioux, Operators are Heros, supra note 31.
59. Newsnight, supra note 31.
60. Charles C. Foti, Jr., Office of Attorney General, State of Louisiana, Attorney
General Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Investigators Looking for Nursing Home Owners,
Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.ag.state.la.us/ViewPressRel.aspx?ReIID-419.
61. Foti, supra note 9.
62. Id
63. Rioux, supra, note 55.
64. Jan Moller, Hospitals, Homes See More Storm Fallout: State Urged to Review
Emergency Plans, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 5, 2005, at 2.
65. Anne Hull & Doug Struck, At Nursing Home, Katrina Dealt only the 1" Blow:
Nuns Labored for Days in the Fatal Heat to Get Help for Patients, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 23,
2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9445206/page/5.
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only eight of forty-one nursing homes evacuated.66 Some of
these decisions not to evacuate were nearly as lethal as the
tragedy at St. Rita's. For example, at least nineteen residents
died in the Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family in eastern
New Orleans.67 The administrator, Sister Augustine McDaniel,
reportedly decided to stay in the brick, two-story building rather
than risk moving her fragile patients on the jammed evacuation
routes, despite the fact that the facility had two evacuation
addresses outside of New Orleans in its emergency
preparedness plan. 68 Most of the nursing home victims of
Katrina did not die in flood waters, like the victims at St. Rita's,
or during evacuation transit. Rather, they died in the days
following the hurricane, like the patients at the Lafon Nursing
Home of the Holy Family, in sweltering hundred-degree
conditions while overwhelmed nursing staff frantically sought
emergency evacuation. 69
RESIDENT DEATHS DURING HURRICANE EVACUATIONS
Nursing home patients from other facilities died during
evacuation from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example,
Thelma Wall, a ninety year-old resident of Huntington Place
Senior Community in Chalmette, Louisiana died during an
evacuation of the facility after an alleged twelve-hour bus ride in
a school bus without air conditioning.70 The investigating police
officer noted that the evacuees had not received medicine, food,
or water during the trip, explaining, "[m]ost of them had to
urinate on themselves and defecate ... [t]he bus stopped one
time in a 12-hour period. I verified that."71 St. Bernard Parish
66. Roma Khanna, Katrina's Toll on the Sick and Elderly Emerges, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2005, at Al, available at
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2005_4016013.
67. Id.
68. Hull & Struck, supra note 65.
69. Khanna, supra note 66.
70. Sandra Barbier, State Probing Death During Evacuation: Family Points Finger at
Nursing Home, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 25, 2005, at 1.
71. Id. (quoting Carencro Police Department Lieutenant Tony Herbert).
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Director of Emergency Preparedness, Larry Ingargiola, praised
the nursing home's decision to evacuate, arguing, "At least they
take the gumption to follow their plan and leave ... [t]hey didn't
abandon them." 72 He explained that all the nursing homes in
the parish including both St. Rita's and Huntington Place, had
filed evacuation plans with his office calling for evacuation of
residents forty-eight hours before a Category Three or stronger
hurricane.7 3
On September 23, 2005, just twenty-five days after
Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Hurricane Rita, a Category
Three storm, came ashore east of Houston.74 In response to
recent events in New Orleans, many in Houston evacuated
inland, causing massive traffic jams.75  In juxtaposition to the
typical Louisiana decision not to evacuate, over 11,000 residents
of nursing homes were evacuated in Texas.76
Unfortunately, the Hurricane Rita evacuation highlights
some of the additional risks inherent in the evacuation of
nursing homes. On the morning of September 23, thirty-eight
patients and six nurses from Brighton Gardens Nursing Home in
Houston, Texas were being evacuated by bus to a nursing home
in Dallas that was also owned by the parent company, Sunrise
Senior Living.77 Twenty-three of the patients burned to death
when the bus caught fire, likely because a faulty rear brake or
wheel fire ignited the patient oxygen tanks in the luggage bays
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Simon Romero & Jere Longman, Storm Lashes Coast; Levees Breached in New
Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at Al.
75. Id.
76. Terri Langford, Melanie Markley & Leigh Hopper, Hurricane Rita: The Aftermath,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1. See also Roma Khanna & James Pinkerton,
Special Needs: Weighing the Risks of Moving the Elderly, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 25,
2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/3369373.htm,
(quoting Beth Ferris of the Austin chapter of Texas Advocates for Nursing Home Residents,
"They were afraid not to evacuate people. Those images of people who died in their beds as
floodwaters rose and the owners who have been indicted were fresh in people's minds when
they decided to evacuate for Rita.").
77. Bus Carrying Elderly Evacuees Burns; 24 Dead, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 24' 2005,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9449949. See also Rick Lyman & Laura Griffin,
Bus Evacuating Senior Center Burns, Killing 24 Near Dallas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005,
at Al.
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under the seats.78  The nursing home had contracted with
BusBank, a charter bus reservation and booking agent to provide
the buses necessary to evacuate their nursing homes.79 The bus,
operated by Global Limo of Pharr, Texas, reportedly had an
illegal license plate, taken from one of the company's other
buses.so The bus driver, Juan Robles Gutierrez, is an
undocumented Mexican National who was initially detained
and referred to a grand jury for twenty-three counts of negligent
homicide despite accounts of his heroic efforts to get patients off
of the bus." The grand jury refused to indict him, although he is
currently required to stay in Houston pending the federal
investigation of the cause of the crash.82 In addition to transfer
trauma, evacuations can expose residents to dangers beyond the
control of nursing home administrators, such as badly
maintained and equipped buses and traffic accidents.
78. Lyman & Griffin, supra note 77.
79. Kevin Johnson, Texas: Ill-fated Charter Bus Had Expired Registration: Fire That
Killed 23 Elderly Evacuees Under Investigation, USA TODAY, at A5. (Sunrise had used
BusBank to secure buses to evacuate Louisiana nursing homes prior to Katrina. Sunrise
spokesperson Sarah Evers explained, "It's our understanding that BusBank has a rigorous
evaluation process.").
80. Terri Langford, Burned Bus Had Illegal Tags, Gaps in Its History, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Sept. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/05/rita/3376111 .html ("On Thursday, Dallas
County Sheriffs Department officials, who traced the burned vehicle's identification
number, said the bus was actually a 1998 model and was registered to an Oklahoma couple
- Robert John and Joanne Jaqueline McMynn - and should have been bearing an
Oklahoma plate. It was not immediately clear why a bus registered to Oklahoma owners
was bearing a tag for an older Texas bus owned by Global. However, a vehicle with an
illegal license plate can make it more difficult for officials to track.").
81. Terri Langford, Bus Driver's Status Clarified, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 26,
2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpVspecial/05/rita/3416518.html (The
driver had the Mexican equivalent of a Class B commercial license.); Thomas Korosec &
James Pinkerton, Bus Fire Started at Rear Wheel, Officials Think, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Oct. 1, 2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/05
/rita/3377512.html (Robles' lawyer, George Shaffer, asserts that his client should not be
held responsible for the bus fire, noting that "[t]here is nothing he should have done and
failed to do."); Terri Langford, Bus Driver's Testimony to Grand Jury Delayed, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.
mpl/special/05/rita/3404730.html.
82. Harvey Rice, Driver in Bus Fire No Longer in Custody, Must Stay Here, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Nov. 17, 2005, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/05/rita/3469426.html.
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PERFUNCTORY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS
Both emergency planning and adequate adherence to building
codes are necessary for nursing homes to be able to contend
with natural disasters. 3  Federal Medicare and Medicaid
regulations require that nursing homes have emergency
preparedness plans that are constructed and maintained in
compliance with the Life Safety Code.M States typically require
emergency preparedness plans as part of nursing home
licensure.85  Despite the existence of these regulatory
requirements, very few nursing homes are cited for inadequate
evacuation plans. In 2004, only one percent of the nation's
17,000 nursing homes were cited by inspectors for inadequate
emergency preparedness, as compared with 31.5% for poor food
sanitation and 14.5% for residents who had pressure sores, a
measurement used as an indicator of both poor care and
inadequate staffing.86 This author contends that the surprisingly
low citation rate for emergency preparedness is directly
attributable to the scanty regulatory requirements for long-term
care facilities rather than any realistic degree of disaster
preparedness in the nation's nursing homes. Investigative
reporting following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita confirms this
suspicion. Reporters from the Houston Chronicle found that only
forty-four of 130 nursing homes in Brazoria, Galveston, and
Harris counties along the Texas Gulf Coast supplied evacuation
plans to nursing home inspectors in 2004 and that fourteen of
Louisiana's parishes "failed to meet the most basic of the state's
requirements: keeping a copy of the homes' evacuation plans on
file at the emergency operation centers."87  Federal and state
83. See DOUGLAS A. SINGH, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITIES 198-201, 376 (2005); Underwood, supra note 21; Tweedy, supra note 23, at
130-132, 150-154.
84. 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(m) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 483.70 (2005).
85. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 9729(A) (1998).
86. Jane Gross, When Crisis Strikes, An Orderly Exit?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at
Fl.
87. Roma Khanna, Lise Olsen, & Anita Hassan, Storm Evacuations: Elderly Were Left
with Weak Safety Net, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec.11, 2005, at Al.
167
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
regulatory laxity is pervasive regarding nursing home
emergency preparedness and should be rectified in order to
protect the nation's nursing home residents.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS FOR
NURSING HOMES
In order to meet the needs of their residents, almost all
nursing homes accept federal funding, typically Medicare and
Medicaid payments. 8 The Medicare statute requires nursing
homes to provide care that attains or maintains "the highest
practicable physical, mental and psychosocial well-being of each
resident."89 The federal Department of Health and Human
Services houses the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) which works with various state healthcare agencies who
conduct annual Skilled Nursing Facilities/Intermediate Care
Facilities (SNF/ICF) surveys to determine "whether the quality
of care, as intended by the law and regulations, and as needed
by the resident, is actually being provided in nursing homes."9 o
The federal regulations require participating nursing homes to
be licensed by state and local authorities.91 The regulatory
standards used by the surveyors apply to both Medicare and
Medicaid eligibility for long-term care facilities. 92 Failure to
implement the regulations may result in CMS finding that the
provider is out of compliance with the regulatory conditions for
participation in the program, and it may either terminate the
provider agreement or use "any other applicable intermediate
sanctions and remedies."93 Because state employees license
88. Three-quarters of nursing homes accept both Medicare and Medicaid and nearly all
accept funds from at least one of the two programs. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CMS Health Care Industry
Market Update - Nursing Facilities (Feb. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/hcimu/hcimu-02062002.pdf.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3 (2003).
90. 42 C.F.R. § 488.110 (2005).
91. 42 C.F.R. § 483.75 (a) (2005).
92. 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (b) (2005).
93. 42 C.F.R. § 488.7(d) (2005); see, e.g., Livingston Care Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Serv., 388 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the facility failed to comply
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nursing homes and typically conduct the SNF/ICF surveys, an
examination of both state and federal emergency preparedness
regulations is necessary for identifying the specific planning and
implementation requirements for a specific nursing home.
CMS requires long-term care facilities to be "designed,
constructed, equipped, and maintained to protect the health and
safety of residents, personnel and the public."94  Structural
inspections by SNF/ICF survey teams currently focus on
whether National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code
requirements are met. 5 In lieu of compliance with the Life
Safety Code, facilities may comply with a similar state law, if
CMS finds that the law "adequately protects patients, residents,
and personnel in long term care facilities."9 6 Facilities also must
have an emergency electrical power system adequate at least for
lighting entrances, exits, fire alarm and suppression equipment,
and life support systems.97 CMS has the authority to "waive
specific provisions of the Life Safety Code which, if rigidly
applied, would result in unreasonable hardship upon the
facility, but only if the waiver does not adversely affect the
health and safety of the patients."98 The regulations do not
contain criteria for determining what constitutes an adverse
affect.
In addition to the structural requirements, CMS requires
long-term care facilities to comply with "all applicable Federal,
State, and local laws, regulations, and codes, and with accepted
professional standards and principles that apply to professionals
providing services in such a facility."99  More specific to
emergency preparedness, facilities also must have "detailed
written plans and procedures to meet all potential emergencies
with Medicare requirement for patients' skin care); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson,
373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004) (failure of generator for emergency lighting one of numerous
violations).
94. 42 C.F.R. § 483.70 (2005).
95. Id. § 483.70 (a)(i).
96. Id. § 483.70 (a)(2).
97. Id. § 483.70 (b).
98. Id. § 483.70 (a)(2).
99. 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(b) (2005).
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and disasters, such as fire, severe weather, and missing
residents," 00 and "must train all employees in emergency
procedures when they begin to work in the facility, periodically
review the procedures with existing staff, and carry out
unannounced staff drills using those procedures."o10
These federal emergency preparedness regulations for long-
term care facilities are vague and unlikely to result in effective
responses to emergencies. The regulations do not contain a
description of the constituent parts of an appropriately detailed
plan, nor do the regulations contain any explicit requirement
that facilities actually follow their plans in the case of an actual
emergency. The inadequacy of these regulations is illustrated by
the Interpretative Guidelines in the State Operation Manual, the
guidance that CMS gives to state investigators who conduct the
SNF/ICF Surveys.102 The guidelines recommend that facilities
tailor disaster plans to both geographic location and to the types
of residents the facility serves, but does not explain what such a
tailored plan should contain. The guidelines explain, "the
purpose of staff drills is to test the efficiency, knowledge, and
response of institutional personnel in the event of an
emergency" and warn that unannounced staff drills to test the
responsiveness of the staff should not "disturb or excite
residents," but they are completely silent as to any sort of criteria
for determining whether a particular drill was effective or how
often they should be conducted. 03  Most telling are the
instructions for surveyors, who are simply required to
separately ask two staff persons, such as nurse aides or
housekeepers, the following questions:
If the fire alarm goes off, what do you do?
If you discover that a resident [is] missing, what do you
100. Id § 483.75(b) (m)(1).
101. Id. § 483.75(b) (m)(2).
102. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, STATE OPERATIONS
MANUAL: APPENDIX PP - GUIDANCE TO SURVEYORS FOR LONG TERM CARE FACLITIES,
at 345, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/downloads/soml07ap pp_guidelines_1tcf.pdf.
103. Id. at 362.
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do?
What would you do if you discovered a fire in a
resident's room?
Where are fire alarms and fire extinguisher(s) located
on this unit?
How do you use the fire extinguisher? 0"
Surveyors are then supposed to use the answers to predict
the staff person's "competency in assuring resident safety."0o
Unfortunately, the location of fire extinguishers has little bearing
on whether a facility is adequately prepared to decide to
weather or evacuate in the case of a natural disaster. The
guidelines do direct surveyors to construct similar probes
relevant to geographically specific natural emergencies such as
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, or floods, but give no
examples, guidance, or criteria for determining whether a
particular locale is likely enough to face a particular type of
disaster in order to warrant the need for a specialized
emergency plan.106  In short, the interpretative guidelines
confirm that the federal emergency preparedness regulations for
long-term care facilities are perfunctory at best, both in their text,
as well as in how they are supposed to be applied by
investigators.
Other types of care facilities for elders and people with
disabilities have similar emergency preparedness regulations.
PACE centers107 and hospices that provide inpatient care also
must comply with the Life Safety Code, or similar state law. 108
PACE Centers are required to "establish, implement, and
maintain documented procedures to manage medical and
nonmedical emergencies and disasters that are likely to threaten
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Programs of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) Centers are adult out-
patient and day-care facilities designed to support seniors such that they are able to continue
living at home rather than in an institution. See Centerfor Medicare & Medicaid Serv., U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Overview, (Dec. 14, 2005) available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/pace.
108. 42 C.F.R. § 418.100(d) (2005).
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the health or safety of the participants, staff, or the public."10
Specifically, they are required to plan for "natural disasters
likely to occur in the organization's geographic area," but they
are not required to plan for disasters that do not typically
occur. 10 Hospices are merely required to have "an acceptable
written plan periodically rehearsed with staff," including
procedures for the care of casualties arising from a disaster."'
In contrast, End-Stage Renal Disease facilities have
surprisingly thorough federal regulations governing disaster
preparedness, requiring written procedures for different kinds
of emergencies with annual testing, review, and revision
requirements under the direction of the facility's chief executive
officer.112 The plans require that each employee be trained and
drilled for specific roles during an emergency." 3 Even more
impressively, the regulations require that patients be "trained to
handle medical and nonmedical emergencies" and that they are
"fully informed regarding what to do, where to go, and whom
to contact if a medical or nonmedical emergency occurs."" 4 In
comparison to the regulatory requirements for long-term care
facilities, the emergency preparedness regulations for End-Stage
Renal Disease facilities are much more specific and likely to
produce effective responses to disasters.
LOUISIANA EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS FOR
NURSING HOMES
Some states have licensure standards for emergency
preparedness that are stricter and more detailed than the federal
requirements. For example, the Louisiana Administrative Code
contains licensure standards for nursing homes, promulgated in
109. 42 C.F.R. § 460.72 (c)(1) (2005).
110. Id. § 460.72 (c)(2)(iv).
111. 42 C.F.R § 418.100(b) (2005).
112. 42 C.F.R. § 405.2140(d) (2005). See also Renal Network, Disaster Planning &
Emergency Preparedness Guidelines & Resources (1996), available at
http://www.therenalnetwork.org/NetworkPolicies/Disaster.html.
113. 42 C.F.R. § 405.2140 (d)(2) (2005).
114. Id. §405.2140 (d)(5).
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1998115 that are significantly higher than the federal standards;116
yet, they still failed to prevent nursing home tragedies during
Hurricane Katrina. The regulation requires nursing homes to
have an emergency preparedness plan in conformity to a model
plan from the Office of Emergency Preparedness.11 7 The written
plan, at minimum, must describe the "evacuation of residents to
a safe place;"'s the continued "delivery of essential care and
services to [ ] residents" wherever they are housed during an
emergency; 119 provisions for management responsibilities and
functions;120 a plan for "coordinating transportation services
required for evacuating residents to another location;"121 and the
115. The Louisiana regulations were strengthened in 1998, in response to several deaths
during the Hurricane George evacuation. Moller, supra note 64, at 2.
116. Nevertheless, the New Orleans Times-Picayune editorial staff characterizes
Louisiana's enforcement of nursing home safety regulations as "unacceptably lax," noting
that despite at least thirty-three nursing home deaths attributable to poor care since 1996, the
state only applies minimal penalties. Editorial, When Care Means Evacuating, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Sep. 20, 2005, at B6.
117. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48 § 9729(A). On July 27, 1999, Colonel Michael L. Brown,
Assistant Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana Military
Department, released the Louisiana Model Nursing Home Emergency Plan ("Plan").
Essentially, the Plan walks a nursing home operator through the necessary steps for creating
a workable plan, including contingency planning; lowest elevation and Flood Hazard Area
information; auxiliary emergency power generators above the projected flood level; air
conditioning and other utilities above the projected flood level; transportation capabilities;
staff members who will evacuate with the nursing home rather than with their own families;
lightening rods; plans for fires, lightening, tornadoes, hurricanes, flooding, hazardous
substances, winter storms, bomb threats, terrorist incidents, nuclear power plant incidents,
earthquakes, and civil disturbances; quarterly drills; sufficient emergency equipment and
supplies for at least forty-eight hours of survival without outside assistance; arrangements to
evacuate residents to specific facilities in specific locations outside of the risk area; Shelter-
In-Plan plans for fast moving emergencies such as tornadoes; and specific responsibilities
for each administrator or staff member. Unfortunately, the Plan highlights a serious
weaknesses in regulatory oversight, noting that the Department of Health and Hospitals,
Bureau of Health Standards:
has no authority or expertise to review emergency plans. Survey protocol requires
only on-site verification that the plan exists, review of employee training in
emergency procedures, and interviews with staff members to determine readiness
for implementation of the plan. The State Fire Marshal's Office will review
specifics of the plan as it relates to the Life Safety Code and other fire laws.
Colonel Michael L. Brown, Assistant Director, La. Office of Emergency Preparedness, LA.
MODEL NURsING HOME EMERGENCY PLAN (July 1999), available at
http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/plans/plansindex.htm.
118. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48 § 9729 (B)(1).
119. Id. § 9729 (B)(2).
120. Id. § 9729 (B)(3).
121. Id. § 9729 (B)(4).
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notification of the resident's family or sponsor if the resident is
evacuated.122 Perhaps more importantly, the regulation requires
the activation of the plan at least annually, "either in response to
an emergency or in a planned drill" with the plan's performance
evaluated, documented, and revised, if necessary.123 Finally, the
plans must be reviewed, approved by the parish's Office of
Emergency Preparedness,124 and made available to the Office of
the State Fire Marshal.125
The missing necessary elements of Louisiana's regulation
were quite clear in light of the deaths and injuries caused by
Hurricane Katrina. Consequently, the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals declared an emergency and amended the
regulations.126 Perhaps most telling is the inclusion of the
following sentence: "The facility shall follow and execute its
approved emergency preparedness plan in the event of the
occurrence of a natural disaster or other emergency." 27 Prior to
this revision, the regulations required the development of a
detailed plan with appropriate drilling and oversight but did not
explicitly require nursing homes to follow their plan in the event
of an emergency.
The Department of Health and Hospitals also added a
number of clauses to the regulation to ensure that nursing
homes were safe to reopen. If a facility was evacuated and
sustained wind, flooding, or power outages, it cannot reopen
until "a joint survey has been conducted by the Office of the
State Fire Marshal, the Office of Public Health and the Bureau of
Health Services Financing, Health Standards Section."128 The
Department explained that the purpose of such a survey is
122. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48 § 9729(B)(5).
123. Id § 9729 (C).
124. Id § 9729 (D).
125. Id § 9729 (E).
126. Revised LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 9729(A). See Department of Health and
Hospitals, Office of the Secretary, Bureau of Health Serv. Financing, Declaration of
Emergency, Oct. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/publications/pubs-
11 2/DECLARATION%200F%20EMERGENCY_009.htm.
127. Revised LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 9729 (A).
128. Id.
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to assure that the facility is in compliance with the licensing
standards in the areas of the structural soundness of the
building, the sanitation code, staffing requirements, and access
to the community service infrastructure (i.e., hospitals,
emergency transportation [including adequate resources for
evacuation], physicians and other professional services, and
necessary supplies).129
Nursing homes that evacuate as a result of a parish's Office
of Emergency Preparedness evacuation order but that did not
sustain damage are allowed to re-open.130 Prior to re-opening
after an evacuation, nursing homes must submit a "detailed
summary to the licensing agency attesting to how the facility's
emergency preparedness plan was followed and executed."131
The summary must include a copy of the facility's approved
emergency preparedness plan, as well as a summary of how the
plan was executed during the emergency; identification of plan
provisions that were not followed; the reasons and mitigating
circumstances for failure to follow any provisions in the plan;
any contingency arrangements made for plan provisions that
were not followed; and a list of injuries and deaths of residents
that occurred during the evacuation and temporary relocation.132
Prior to re-opening, the licensing agency must certify that the
facility was in substantial compliance with its emergency
preparedness plan.33 If the licensing agency cannot determine
whether the nursing home was in substantial compliance with
its plan, then it may conduct an on-site survey or
investigation. 3 4 If the licensing agency finds that the "facility
failed to comply with the provisions of its plan, the facility shall
not be allowed to re-open." 35
There is only one published opinion regarding Louisiana
129. Id. § 9729 (F)(1).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 9729 (G)(1).
132. Id. § 9729 (G)(1)(a)-(e).
133. Revised LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 9729 (G)(2)(a).
134. Id. § 9729 (G)(2)(b).
135. Id. § 9729 (G)(2)(c).
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Department of Health and Hospitals enforcement of the
emergency preparedness regulations. In In re Maison Deville
Nursing Home, the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit heard an appeal regarding a $1,500 fine for a violation of
the emergency preparedness plan regulation that resulted in the
death of a resident.136 During the 1998 evacuation of New
Orleans for Hurricane George, a resident of the Maison Deville
Nursing home died during an eight-hour bus ride from New
Orleans to Baton Rouge.137 Although the bus had an air
conditioner, it only worked well only when the bus was moving,
not when the bus was stopped in a traffic jam.13 8 Water and
snacks for the residents where inaccessible, placed in the bottom
bay of the bus.13 9 The Department found that the nursing home
had violated the emergency preparedness regulation and fined
the home $1,500.140 On appeal, an administrative law judge
reduced the fine to $1,000 in an undated letter to the Director of
the Department.141 The Department of Health and Hospitals'
Director reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, a
decision which was upheld by the district court.142  The
Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory
ten-day time period given to the Director to reverse the
administrative law judge had not been violated when there was
no way to determine the date of entry of the administrative law
judge's decision.143
The nursing home emergency preparedness regulations of
the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Services are
superior to the underdeveloped federal regulations.
Nevertheless, an administrative fine for $1,500 for the death of a
resident is unlikely to alter noncompliant behavior by nursing
home administrators. Minimal regulatory fines may be one
136. 797 So. 2d 728, 729 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id
141. Id at 729.
142. In re Maison Deville Nursing Home, 797 So. 2d at 730.
143. Id.
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reason that only about one-third of the nursing homes in
Katrina's path complied with mandatory evacuation orders.1"'
Technical compliance with the regulations is meaningless unless
nursing homes train, drill, implement, follow, and then adapt
their plans based on experience, as is intended by the post-
Katrina revisions to the regulations. The federal government
and other states should learn from the Louisiana example and
strengthen and then require compliance with their emergency
preparedness plans. The threat of rescinding their Medicaid and
Medicare provider agreements would provide the apparently
necessary impetus to force states and the nursing home industry
to better prepare for emergencies.
FAILURE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN
NURSING HOME EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
In lieu of strengthened regulatory oversight, advocates for
nursing home residents could seek legislative action in the
various state capitols. Statutory remedies have the added
advantage of giving state regulators stronger authority upon
which to draft good regulations. Unfortunately, state statutory
schemes designed to strengthen construction standards for
nursing home buildings and emergency preparedness
requirements, in light of threats from natural disasters, have
been strongly resisted by the nursing home lobby as shown by
the outcomes of attempted reforms in Florida and Louisiana.
FLORIDA
Hurricane Andrew devastated parts of southern Florida on
August 24, 1992, killing twenty-three people and causing $26.5
billion in damage. 145 In response to Hurricane Andrew, the
Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee
144. Khanna, supra note 66. Undoubtedly, the new regulations will result in a much
higher percentage of evacuation when the next hurricane comes ashore.
145. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Hurricane Andrew, Ten Years Later,
Aug. 22, 2002, available at http://www.noaa.gov/hurricaneandrew.html.
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authored the Lewis Report in 1993, which found that health care
providers, rather than local county emergency management
authorities, were better able to care for the needs of residents
with special medical needs during disasters.'" Consequently, in
1993, the Florida Legislature passed a statute requiring the
Agency of Health Care Administration to draft regulations
requiring "all nursing homes and hospitals to become
structurally capable of serving as shelters and be equipped to be
self-supporting during disasters."147
146. Florida Agency for Health Care Admin., Recommended Physical Plant
Improvements to Existing Nursing Homes for Disaster Preparedness: A Report to the
Governor and the Legislature 1 (1999).
147. Id. at 2. After passage of the FLORIDA SESSION LAWS, Chapters 93-211 in 1993,
the relevant sections of the Florida Statutes follow:
§ 395.1055. Rules and enforcement
(1) The agency shall adopt, amend, promulgate, and enforce rules to implement
the provisions of this part, which shall include reasonable and fair minimum
standards for ensuring that:
(a) Sufficient numbers and qualified types of personnel and occupational
disciplines are on duty and available at all times to provide necessary and
adequate patient care and safety.
(b) Infection control, housekeeping, sanitary conditions, and medical record
procedures that will adequately protect patient care and safety are established and
implemented.
(c) A comprehensive emergency management plan is prepared and updated
annually. Such standards must be included in the rules adopted by the agency after
consulting with the Department of Community Affairs. At a minimum, the rules
must provide for plan components that address emergency evacuation
transportation; adequate sheltering arrangements; postdisaster activities, including
emergency power, food, and water; postdisaster transportation; supplies; staffing;
emergency equipment; individual identification of residents and transfer of
records, and responding to family inquiries. The comprehensive emergency
management plan is subject to review and approval by the local emergency
management agency. During its review, the local emergency management agency
shall ensure that the following agencies, at a minimum, are given the opportunity
to review the plan: the Department of Elderly Affairs, the Department of Health,
the Agency for Health Care Administration, and the Department of Community
Affairs. Also, appropriate volunteer organizations must be given the opportunity
to review the plan. The local emergency management agency shall complete its
review within 60 days and either approve the plan or advise the facility of
necessary revisions.
(d) Facilities are structurally capable of serving as shelters and equipped to
be self-supporting during and immediately following disasters.
(e) Construction, maintenance, repair, life safety, and renovation of licensed
facilities are governed by the most recently adopted, nationally recognized life-
safety code, except as may be specifically modified by rule.
§ 400.23. Rules; minimum standards; evaluation and rating system; fee for review
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Over the next four years, the Agency for Health Care
Administration attempted to develop regulations in accordance
with the statute. Unfortunately, an agency publication explains,
"[b]ecause the economic impact to implement these changes to
all of the new and existing health care facilities throughout the
state was very costly, the health care providers were resistant to
the promulgation of this rule and began to encourage the
Legislature to revise these statutes." 148 In 1998, the Florida
Legislature gutted the requirement that all nursing homes be
self-supporting and capable of serving as a shelter, instead
limiting the requirement to just new facilities, wings, or floors,
and limiting the shelter capability requirement to residents, staff,
and their families. 149 As if that was not sufficient to undermine
of plans...
(2) Pursuant to the intention of the Legislature, the agency shall publish and
enforce rules to implement the provisions of this part, which shall include
reasonable and fair minimum standards in relation to:
(a) The location and construction of the facility; including fire and life safety,
plumbing, heating, lighting, ventilation, and other housing conditions which will
ensure the health, safety, and comfort of residents, including an adequate call
system. The agency shall establish standards for facilities and equipment to
increase the extent to which facilities are structurally capable of serving as
shelters and equipped to be self-supporting during and immediately following
disasters. In making such rules, the agency shall be guided by standards
recommended by nationally recognized reputable professional groups and
associations with knowledge of such subject matters. The agency shall update or
revise such standards as the need arises. All nursing homes must comply with
those life safety code requirements and building code standards applicable at the
time of approval of their construction plans. The agency may require alterations to
a building if it determines that an existing condition constitutes a distinct hazard to
life, health, or safety. The agency shall adopt fair and reasonable rules setting forth
conditions under which existing facilities undergoing additions, alterations,
conversions, renovations, or repairs shall be required to comply with the most
recent updated or revised standards. (Emphasis added).
148. Florida Agency for Health Care Admin., supra note 146, at 2.
149. 1998 Fla. Laws, Chapter 98-89
§ 395.1055.(1) The agency shall adopt, amend, promulgate, and enforce rules to implement
the provisions of this part, which shall include reasonable and fair minimum standards for
ensuring that:
(d) New facilities and a new wing or floor added to an existing facility after July 1,
1999, are structurally capable of serving as shelters only for patients, staff, and families of
staff and patients, and equipped to be self-supporting during and immediately following
disasters.
§ 400.23(2)(a)
The location and construction of the facility; including fire and life safety,
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the statutory requirement that nursing homes be prepared to
withstand natural disasters, the Legislature also required the
agency to "work with facilities licensed under this part and
report to the Governor and Legislature by April 1, 1999, its
recommendations for cost-effective renovation standards to be
applied to existing facilities."5 0 Requiring a regulatory agency
to consult with representatives from a regulated industry to
ensure that any requirements are cost effective is tantamount to
giving the industry veto power over any proposed change. This
alteration of the statutory text to delay and then weaken
structural safety requirements shows the power of the nursing
home lobby in Florida.
The agency complied with the new version of the statute
and published recommendations for minimum standards meant
to improve resident safety.'5' In view of the Florida Legislature's
mandate to consider the economic impact on the nursing home
industry, the agency recommended, "[t]o reduce the amount of
reconstruction required to meet these recommendations, an area
within the structure of the building should be designated where
residents and support services can be located. If this is done,
plumbing, heating, lighting, ventilation, and other housing conditions which will
ensure the health, safety, and comfort of residents, including an adequate call
system. The agency shall establish standards for facilities and equipment to
increase the extent to which new facilities and a new wing or floor added to an
existing facility after July 1, 1999, are structurally capable of serving as shelters
only for residents, staff, and families of residents and staff, and equipped to be
self-supporting during and immediately following disasters. The Agency for
Health Care Administration shall work with facilities licensed under this part
and report to the Governor and Legislature by April 1, 1999, its
recommendations for cost-effective renovation standards to be applied to
existing facilities. In making such rules, the agency shall be guided by criteria
recommended by nationally recognized reputable professional groups and
associations with knowledge of such subject matters. The agency shall update or
revise such criteria as the need arises. All nursing homes must comply with those
life safety code requirements and building code standards applicable at the time of
approval of their construction plans. The agency may require alterations to a
building if it determines that an existing condition constitutes a distinct hazard to
life, health, or safety. The agency shall adopt fair and reasonable rules setting forth
conditions under which existing facilities undergoing additions, alterations,
conversions, renovations, or repairs shall be required to comply with the most
recent updated or revised standards. (Emphasis Added).
150. Id.
151. See Florida Agency for Health Care Admin., supra note 146.
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then the entire facility will not have to undergo renovation." 152
The resulting recommendations include: a shelter area that has
at least thirty net square feet per resident, location above the
100-year flood plan and Category Three hurricane surge
inundation elevation, hurricane shutters to cover windows;
sufficient air conditioning or mechanical ventilation to "ensure
the health, safety and well-being of all residents and staff during
and immediately following a disaster;" an on-site Level One
emergency electrical generator system sufficient to support ice
making, food refrigeration, lighting, life support systems, and
air conditioning with fuel for seventy-two hours; and three
gallons of clean water for each resident and one gallon for
anyone else in the facility per day for three days.5 3
Even the weakened version of the statute was apparently
too restrictive for the nursing home lobby. In 2000, the
Legislature stripped the Agency for Health Care
Administration's authority to adopt construction standards and
the Agency was directed to "provide assistance to the Florida
Building Commission in updating the construction standards of
the code relative to nursing homes."'5 Fortunately, the
structural provisions advocated by the Agency were included
within the Florida Building Code. 55  Nevertheless, these
standards still only apply to new facilities or wings, and the
agency responsible for surveying facilities no longer has direct
regulatory control over the standards.
LOUISIANA
Florida is not the only state with a powerful nursing home
industry. Even in the period immediate following Hurricane
Katrina, the Louisiana Senate weakened an attempt to
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id at 4-10.
154. 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 00-141 (West).
155. FLA. BUILDING CODE, Section 420 Nursing Homes, available at
http://infosolutions.com/icce/gateway.dll?f-templates$fn=default.htm$vid=icc:floridabuild
ing.
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strengthen nursing home regulations. During the Extraordinary
Session in October 2005, Representative Monica Walker
introduced House Bill Five which would require the Department
of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations
governing the "establishment, reestablishment, or continued
operation" of nursing homes, hospitals, and intermediate care
facilities for people with developmental disabilities located in
"areas subject to hurricanes, tidal surges, or flooding." 56 The
original bill required the Department to include stricter building
codes and restrictions of facility location in the new
regulations.1 57  The bill passed the Louisiana House
unanimously, with only an amendment requiring health-care
facilities to have a satellite communication system for emergency
communication.15 8
Unfortunately, House Bill Five faced powerful opposition in
the Louisiana Senate. The Department of Health and Hospitals
supported the original version of House Bill Five, and wanted to
ensure that nursing homes destroyed by Katrina were not
rebuilt in the same low-lying locations.59 Joseph Donchess, the
Executive Director of the Louisiana Nursing Home Association,
expressed the industry's opposition, explaining, "[wie don't
think stricter building codes necessarily are the answer for
existing facilities.. .I guess what I'm asking is that you not use a
mallet to hammer in a nail."160 The Louisiana Nursing Home
Association has a powerful ally in Senator Joe McPherson, the
Chair of the Health and Welfare Committee and co-owner of
Maison de Lafayette Nursing Home who significantly amended
House Bill Five in committee in order to protect existing nursing
156. H.R. 5, Ist Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2005), available at
http://www.legis.state.1a.us/billdata/history.asp?sessionid=051ES&billid=HB5.
157. Jan Moller, Exemption Added to Nursing Home Bill Existing Facilities May Not
Need Upgrades, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 4.
158. Briefing Book: News and Views from the Louisiana Capitol, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Nov. 12, 2005, at 3.
159. Jan Moller, Exemption Added to Nursing Home Bill Existing Facilities May Not
Need Upgrades, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 4 (citing testimony of Department of
Health and Hospitals Undersecretary Charles Castille).
160. Id.
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homes. 161
The Senate amendments to House Bill Five focused on four
key changes to protect existing nursing homes and hospitals.
The Senate amendments attempted to strip the phrase
"continued operation" out of the bill, thus exempting any
nursing home that did not evacuate during Katrina but
continued to operate from the new regulations.162 Secondly, the
amendments sought to limit any new location restrictions of
health care facilities to "newly approved facilities." 63 In order to
finance any new required changes, the amendments included
provisions for the fair allocation of the Medicaid share of facility
specific costs directly incurred by a facility as a result of
compliance with any new regulations pursuant to the statute.'6
Finally, and perhaps most cynically, the Senate amendments
stripped the word "stricter" from the bill in regards to building
and construction codes and guidelines.165 The House rejected
the Senate's amendments in a vote of ninety-nine to zero on
November 21, 2005, and appointed conference committee
members, including Representative Walker, the bill's author.166
The Senate's conferees included Senator McPherson. 67
On whole, the nursing home industry won a significant
161. Legislative Rogues' Gallery, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 2005, at 6; Weakness of
State Public Disclosure Law Emphasized, LAFAYETTE DAILY ADVERTISER, April 27, 2005,
available at http://www.la-par.org/PAR%20News%2OFiles/Advertiser4272005.pdf; Too
Much Power, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 25, 2005, at 4 ("The nursing home industry is among
the largest employers in some rural parts of Louisiana. It gives out scads of campaign
contributions. Sen. Joe McPherson, the chairman of the Senate committee with jurisdiction
over the industry, is himself the co-owner of a nursing home. In other words, Louisiana's
nursing home operators have plenty enough power to protect their interests in the state
Capitol. And too much power for anyone else's good. Legislators and state health officials
need to recognize that, when they give the nursing home industry its way time and time
again, they're jeopardizing the welfare of senior citizens and the state's finances.").
162. See OFFICIAL J. OF SENATE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, Nov. 16, 2005, at 11-12
(Amendments 1, 5, 8).
163. See id at 11-12 (Amendments 3, 7, 10).
164. Id
165. See id. at 11-12 (Amendments 2, 6, 9).
166. H.R. 5, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2005), available at
http://www.legis.state.1a.us/billdata/history.asp?sessionid=05 1 ES&billid=HB5.
167. Id.
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battle within the conference committee for House Bill Five.168
Although the conferees rejected the Senate's amendment, which
would prevent application of the new regulations to nursing
homes that "continued operation" during Hurricane Katrina, all
of the other Senate amendments were accepted, including the
stripping of the requirement that the regulations include stricter
building codes and guidelines.'6 9 The conferees even included a
new limitation on the power of the Department of Health and
Hospitals, requiring the regulations to have "provisions for
reasonable time periods for compliance, not to exceed three
years, except when extensions are granted by the department for
good cause."7 0 The net result of the Conference Committee
Report is that the Department of Health and Hospitals is
directed to draft regulations regarding nursing homes and
hospitals in areas subject to hurricanes, tidal surges, or floods,
but the regulations do not have to include stricter building codes
or guidelines; only newly approved nursing homes will be
subject to any location restrictions.'71 Nursing homes have a
three year window in which to comply, and they may use
Medicaid funds for any costs incurred in order for the facility to
comply with the regulations.172 Governor Blanco signed the bill
as Act Forty-One of the First Extraordinary Session on December
6, 2005.173
Florida and Louisiana exemplify the difficulty of
strengthening nursing home building codes related to
emergency preparedness within state legislatures. Presumably,
nursing home industry lobbyists may not wield the same power
in all state legislatures, but reliance upon state statutes to
strengthen nursing home emergency preparedness is unlikely to
168. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, Nov. 22, 2005, at 38-39.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Louisiana Legislature, HB5 - 2005 1st Extraordinary Session (Act 41), available at
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/history.asp?sessionid=05 1ES&billid=HB5 (Dec. 7,
2005).
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be either consistent or enduring. A patchwork quilt of widely
differing state standards, dependent upon the strength of the
nursing home industry in each state, leaves residents of nursing
homes more vulnerable than they would be under a uniform
national standard. Perhaps even more dangerous is the ability
of the nursing home industry to ease expensive regulatory
standards over time, such as they did in Florida, once memories
of the most recent disaster are no longer fresh. A uniform
national standard likely would require more political capital to
amend and would allow advocates for residents to mount a
national defense against any attempts to undermine facility
safety, rather than fighting fifty smaller battles.
USING TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW TO ENCOURAGE EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
Death and injury caused by either the failure to evacuate or poor
quality evacuation can expose nursing homes owners and
administrators to both tort and criminal liability. These
remedies obviously only occur after a tragedy, when residents
have already been hurt or killed. Consequently, although they
can serve as punishment and may help to make victims, or their
heirs whole, these remedies are reactionary rather than
prescriptive and will only improve resident safety in the future
to the extent that they deter future tortuous or criminal
negligence.
TORT SuTS AGAINST NURSING HOME OPERATORS
Tort litigation is increasingly burdensome to nursing
homes. Until the past decade, civil lawsuits brought against
nursing homes or their staff were relatively rare.'74  One
commentator has noted that in medical error cases, "this
previously tranquil part of the legal picture has changed
dramatically lately" due, in part, to growing jury verdicts, a
174. Kapp, supra note 11, at 67.
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larger cadre of expert witnesses, and the enactment of legislation
favorably to plaintiffs.175 Of course, an alternate explanation is
simply that there are ample opportunities to bring meritorious
suits against nursing homes and their staff due to negligence,
elder abuse, and professional malpractice committed against
residents. 7 6 Regardless of the root cause of nursing home's
increasing legal exposure, both damages and liability insurance
premiums are rising exponentially.'" The rising liability and
insurance premiums have resulted in a number of facilities being
sold, and twenty-three of seventy-nine insurers of long-term
care facilities in Florida stopped providing coverage in the
period from 1997 to 2000.178
The failure of a nursing home operator to adequately
prepare for or respond to a natural disaster in a fashion that led
to the injury or death of patrons is likely to result in personal
injury or wrongful death suits and may significantly add to the
burden felt by Gulf Coast nursing homes and their insurers. 179
In addition to wrongful death, surviving family members in
Louisiana may file an action to recover for the pain and suffering
experienced by a dying nursing home patient between the time
of injury and death.o80  This survival action for pain and
suffering may result in significant damages in cases where
175. Id.
176. Martha Marie Eastman, Ensure Justice in Nursing Home Cases, 41 TRIAL 62 (Oct.
2005).
177. See Richard H. Tilghman IV, Rethinking Constitutional Limitations on Punitive
Damages: Providing Economically Efficient Incentives to Prevent Nursing Home Abuse, 54
DEPAuL L. REv. 1007, 1011 (2005) ("Recent studies show that nursing homes are sued at a
rate of 14.5 lawsuits for every 1,000 beds, which is double the rate from just five years ago.
Since 1997, the average claim paid has risen by twenty-eight percent, from $156,000 to
$200,000. The increase in lawsuits, liability, and damages has caused nursing home liability
insurance premiums to increase by about 400% since 1998, to $80,000 per facility.").
178. Id. at 1012.
179. Suits have already been filed against St. Rita's Nursing Home. See Parker, supra
note 31. Additionally, Texas personal injury firms have filed suits against all the entities
involved in the bus fire that killed the Brighton Gardens Nursing Home residents. Brenda
Sapino Jeffreys, First Suits Filed in Bus Fire Case, TEXAS LAWYER ONLINE, Oct. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleFriendlyTX.jsp?id=1 129280706891.
180. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Magnolia Living Center, Inc., 870 So 2d 1111, 1112-1113 (La.
Ct. App. 2004) (heir of nursing home resident sued for survival claim when her mother
spent fifteen days in a hospital dying of a urinary tract infection, pneumonitis, dehydration
and decubitus ulcers contracted while in a nursing home).
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residents suffered in sweltering conditions as they slowly died
of dehydration and heat exhaustion.
Another key concern for nursing homes in emergency
situations should be the evacuation of patients whose known
health problems contraindicate their survival if moved. Nursing
homes typically have the same duty of care as hospitals and,
although they are not required to insure the health of their
residents, they must provide a reasonable standard of care that
takes into account the patient's known mental and physical
condition."" The risk assessment regarding the evacuation of
extremely frail patients puts nursing home administrators in a
"Catch-22;" either they risk the patient dying during evacuation
or from transfer trauma, or they risk the patient dying during
the disaster or its aftermath.18 2
Nursing homes have a number of potentially strong legal
defenses to liability caused by their responses to disasters. Three
causation defenses may prove to be the most reliable, depending
upon the facts in each particular case. First, in cases like the
Brighton Gardens Nursing Home bus fire, the nursing home
itself has a fairly strong argument that the proximate cause of
the deaths of their residents was a faulty bus, which was
completely outside of its control. Plaintiff's counsel may find a
way to link nursing homes to deaths and injuries caused by
contractors during evacuations, such as a nursing home's failure
to communicate necessary information regarding the health
status of its residents. However, the burden to make those
connections will rest with the plaintiff. Secondly, plaintiffs must
prove that the negligence of the nursing home, rather than the
resident's underlying health problems, was responsible for the
death or injury.8 3 Finally, the nursing home may be able to
successfully raise an act of God defense in situations where
181. Lemoine v. Insurance Co. of North America, 499 So 2d 1004 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
182. According to reports, both Mabel Mangano at St. Rita's Nursing home and Sister
Augustine McDaniel at Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family struggled with this
dilemma in the hours prior to Hurricane Katrina. See Newsnight, supra note 31; Hull &
Struck supra note 65.
183. Kapp, supra note 11, at 67.
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natural disasters rather than the negligence kill residents. The
commentary to the proposed final draft of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Torts defines an "act of God" as "a serious
and unusual adverse natural event."8" In situations where an
adverse natural event is unforeseeable, such as a tornado
touching down without a tornado warning having been
announced, the defendant might successfully avoid liability in a
negligence suit.185 An act of God, however, does not preclude
recovery under negligence theory so long as the defendant's
negligence is also the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.186
Foreseeability and whether the defendant's precautions for
foreseeable adverse natural events were reasonable are the
touchstones for understanding the act of God defense.'17 The
foreseeability of floods, such as the one at St. Rita's Nursing
Home, depends on whether the flood's "occurrence and
magnitude should or might have been anticipated, in view of the
flood history of the locality and the existing conditions affecting
the likelihood of floods, by a person of reasonable prudence." 88
The burden for arguing that a flood was an act of God, rather
than a foreseeable event, rests with the defendant and is a
question for the jury.189
In addition to the causation defenses, defendants in a
nursing home natural disaster case have the benefit, at least in
Louisiana, of arguing that the federal Medicare and Medicaid
regulations do not substitute for expert testimony of the relevant
standard of care in a medical malpractice action. In Satterwhite v.
Reily,10 the plaintiff in a wrongful death and survival action
against the medical director of a nursing home argued that the
doctor's alleged failure to comply with CMS regulations
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. 1(2005).
18 5. Id.
186. Keystone Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 351 (Iowa 1998)
("when neglect in the employment of a human agency is combined with an act of God,
liability for damage results from such neglect").
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, cmt. 1(2005) (Proposed Final Draft).
188. Keystone Elec. Mfg. Co., 586 N.W.2d at 351 (citing 78 Am. Jur. 2d § 224 at 669).
189. Id.
190. Satterwhite v. Reilly, 817 So. 2d 407, 409-410 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
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constituted a breach of the standard of care. The Court of
Appeals disagreed:
no court has ever imposed a tort duty upon a nursing
home's medical director based solely on this regulatory
provision ... nothing in the regulation sets forth a
standard of care for medical directors; the purpose is
plainly to qualify providers for the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. On this record and on the
authority cited, we decline to hold that 42 C.F.R. §
483.75(i) grants a private cause of action against a
medical director of a nursing home or establishes the
standard of care or duty that a nursing home medical
director owes to the patients of the nursing home he
serves, or that a violation of the regulation is negligence
per se.191
This holding is important in natural disaster cases if
plaintiffs attempt to use CMS regulations alone to prove that
nursing home medical staff or nurses violated the standard of
care owed to the resident. Additional proof, typically expert
testimony regarding the failure of the defendant to meet a
reasonable standard of care, is necessary to prove that a flawed
professional decision is responsible for causing the resident's
injury or death.192
Despite the existence of potential tort defenses, the horrific
nature of resident deaths and injuries that happened during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may result in a situation where Gulf
Coast juries are so angered that nursing homes will be exposed
to climate of de facto strict liability. Nursing homes may be
punished for every patient death or injury regardless of whether
there is ascertainable negligence. If this forecast is correct, there
will be significant financial strain on the nursing home industry
and their insurers, perhaps to the point that Gulf Coast states
will experience a marked reduction in the number of nursing
home beds. Even if the impact is less dramatic, costs drained
from nursing homes by tort litigation will reduce funds available
191. Id at 412.
192. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794. See, e.g., Hinson v. Glen Oak Retirement
System, 853 So. 2d 726 (La.Ct. App. 2003).
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for improved patient care, facility repair, and heightened
emergency preparedness.1 93
While nursing home tort lawsuits may further the interests
of justice for injured patients and their heirs, there is some
concern that tort liability, by itself, is unlikely to deter poor
healthcare decisions.194 Exposure to liability in cases where the
provider is not negligent may lead to over-deterrence, where
providers practice defensive and unnecessary healthcare to
avoid liability, rather than focusing on providing the best,
necessary care for the patient.9 5 In the context of nursing home
emergency preparedness, such defensive measures may result in
the unnecessary evacuation of residents, simply to avoid low
probability tragedies. Although responsibility for negligent
emergency decision is important, this author contends that
regulators, with adequately stringent regulations at their
disposal, are better equipped than juries to remedy poor nursing
home emergency preparedness. In truly egregious cases, gross
violations of strong regulations may actually strengthen
personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits, but for more
mundane violations, an annual visit by surveyors may actually
bring about better results and keep more nursing homes in
operation than occasional massive jury verdicts.
CRIMINAL SuITS AGAINST NuRSmNG HOME OPERATORS
In addition to tort litigation, nursing home operators who
fail to appropriately respond to emergencies may find
themselves facing criminal sanctions. The pending prosecution
of Salvador and Mabel Mangano provides a clear example for
193. R. Patrick Bedell, The Next Frontier in Tort Reform: Promoting the Financial
Solvency ofNursing Homes, 11 ELDER L. J. 361, 392 (2003).
194. Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal Responses to
Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL. MED. 37, 38-9 (2003) ("Where patient safety is concerned -
"deterrence" is the term more familiar to attorneys-malpractice liability seems, at least on
the margin, to have little if any positive correlation to future error reduction. At the same
time the malpractice system fosters distortions in medical practice ("defensive medicine")
whose value to patient health may run from the arguably useful to the decidedly harmful.").
195. Bedell, supra note 193, at 382.
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analyzing the potential difficulties in prosecuting nursing home
operators for deaths resulting from the failure to appropriately
prepare and respond to a natural disaster. Salvador and Mabel
Mangano are charged with thirty-four counts of negligent
homicide of the residents who died at St. Rita's Nursing Home.
Louisiana Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr. based his
decision to charge on the Mangano's alleged failure to follow St.
Bernard Parish's mandatory evacuation order and St. Rita's own
evacuation plan coupled with the alleged refusal of evacuation
assistance from the parish. 196 In Louisiana, negligent homicide
is "the killing of a human being by criminal negligence."1 97
Criminal negligence exists "when, although neither specific nor
general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the
interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross
deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained
by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances."198
Consequently, the state must prove that the Mangano's failure to
evacuate the residents of St. Rita's amounted to a gross deviation
below the standard of care expected from a reasonably careful
nursing home operator in similar circumstances. Section B of
Louisiana's negligent homicide statute only allows the violation
of a statute or ordinance to be considered as presumptive
evidence of a gross deviation below the standard of care.199
Although the prosecution has plenty of ground for moral
indignation, it may have a difficult time convicting the
Manganos of negligent homicide under the criminal standard of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed earlier, the
Louisiana licensure and Federal Medicare/Medicaid regulations
required the existence of an emergency preparedness plan and
related drills, but they did not explicitly require nursing homes
to follow their emergency plan. The state will be hard-pressed
to show that the Manganos violated a statute or ordinance
requiring evacuation. The revision of the regulations on October
196. Foti, supra note 9.
197. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (1997).
198. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:12 (1997).
199. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (B) (1997).
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18, 2005, to explicitly require evacuation may, in fact, serve as a
tacit admission that the regulations in place during Hurricane
Katrina did not require the Manganos to evacuate their
residents. The case is complicated further by factual questions
as to when St. Bernard Parish declared a mandatory evacuation
and whether the Manganos were given notice of this
declaration.200
Without a statutory or ordinance violation, the state will
need to convince the jury that the Manganos were grossly
negligent based on a reasonable person standard. If the
evidence at trial matches the published reports regarding the St.
Rita's tragedy, the state will need to overcome a number of
factual issues that go to whether their alleged negligence was a
gross deviation from reasonable carefulness. Because St. Rita's
had relatively few complaints or citations, it will be difficult to
portray the Manganos as chronic offenders that were indifferent
to the safety of their residents. The fact that the Manganos were
on the premises when the flooding occurred and stayed to
rescue as many residents as possible will also raise similar
obstacles to proving a "disregard of the interest of others." As
only about one-third of the nursing homes affected by Hurricane
Katrina in Louisiana reportedly evacuated, the state will find it
difficult to argue that the Manganos acted unreasonably when
compared to others in like circumstances. 201  Finally, the
legitimate fear of deaths caused by transfer trauma when
coupled with a belief that St. Rita's was safe because it was brick,
had a generator and available nursing staff, and was on higher
ground that had not flooded in previous hurricanes, provides a
somewhat plausible explanation for why the Manganos decided
to ride out Hurricane Katrina. Even a key prosecution witness,
Dr. Bryan Bertucci, is on record as saying that "the fact people
don't understand that we have evacuated several times where
the hurricane didn't even come near us. And two to three of our
200. See supra, notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
201. Hull & Struck, supra note 65.
192 [Vol. 7
2006] NURSING HOME EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
nursing home patients, each time we transport them out, die." 202
If the facts as presented in the press are similar to those
presented at trial, the Mangano's choice not to evacuate may be
found negligent, but not grossly negligent, and mere negligence
is an insufficient basis for negligent homicide in Louisiana.203
The state does have a fairly strong counter-argument
regarding a heightened standard of care and the failure to
perform a special duty. In State v. Irvine, the Louisiana Supreme
Court heard a case regarding a fatal train accident caused by
negligent switching.2 04 In response to an argument that the
defendant was merely inattentive rather than grossly negligent,
the court held that "where one is charged with a special duty the
nonperformance of which involves danger to the safety of
others, the failure to perform the duty even through inattention
is gross and culpable, or, in other words, criminal negligence." 205
Arguably, the Manganos should be held to a "special duty"
standard based on their care responsibility for relatively
helplessness clients, the existence of an evacuation plan, and
Mrs. Mangano's alleged refusal of buses with which to evacuate.
In other words, a reasonable nursing home operator who had an
evacuation plan and the means to evacuate should have made a
more informed decision than an average reasonably careful
person because of the safety and regulatory information of
which the operator should be familiar.
Like the tort litigation, perhaps the most contentious issue
will be causation. The state must prove beyond a reasonable
202. Newsnight; Hurricane Ophelia; Nursing Home Deaths Probe; Missing Children;
Dolphin Discovery; Inside the Superdome; Rebuilding Biloxi (CNN Sept.14, 2005),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/14/asb.02.html.
203. Louisiana v. D.L., 697 So. 2d 706, 711 (La. Ct. App. 1997) ("Unlike general or
specific criminal intent, criminal negligence is essentially negative. Rather than requiring
that the accused intend some consequence of his actions, criminal negligence is found from
the accused's gross disregard for the consequences of his actions. Ordinary negligence does
not equate to criminal negligence. Thus, the state is required to show more than a mere
deviation from the standard of ordinary care."); Louisiana v. Moak, 387 So. 2d 1108, 1110
(La. 1980) ("the wrong choice of action in an emergency does not meet the test of criminal
negligence").
204. Louisiana v. Irvine, 52 So. 567 (La. 1910).
205. Id. at 569.
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doubt that the Manganos' alleged criminal negligence was the
cause of the deaths of the thirty-four victims. 206 In Louisiana v.
Martin, a negligent homicide case factually rooted in a high
speed car race that killed the occupants of a third vehicle, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held, "Our later decisions have made
it clear that the defendant's conduct need not be the sole
proximate cause of the victim's death. Rather, the proper test is
whether: 'Was the defendant's conduct a substantial factor in
bringing about the forbidden result?" 207 Clearly, if the flooding
was caused by levees which could reasonably be expected to
hold, then the causation of the deaths is at least partially
attributable to the governmental agencies responsible for
designing and maintaining the levee system. If, however,
flooding was reasonably foreseeable, the existence of another
potential tortfeasor does not excuse the decision not to evacuate.
The likely answer to the causation question is to require
significant expert testimony in the trial and may allow the
defense the strategic opportunity to turn the case into a trial of
the state and federal government's failure to properly build and
maintain Louisiana's flood control system.
The Manganos' trial will be a prime opportunity to
determine whether a high profile criminal action against a
negligent nursing home owner has a behavioral impact on other
owners and administrators. At a broader level, while
punishment may be an appropriate societal goal when patients
die because of a nursing home's failure to appropriately respond
to a natural disaster, the more pressing issue for residents is
whether criminal sanctions will have a deterrent effect that
encourages the nursing home industry to strengthen emergency
preparedness measures. The weakness of relying on criminal
sanctions to improve conditions in nursing homes is that elder
abuse and neglect, and related crimes, such as negligent
homicide or manslaughter are difficult to prosecute. 208  One
206. Louisiana v. Hammontree, 363 So. 2d 1364, 1372 (La. 1978).
207. 539 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (La. 1989) (citing State v. Matthews, 450 So. 2d 644, 646
(La. 1984)).
208. Michael J. Davidson, Governmental Responses to Elder Abuse and Neglect in
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commentator attributes this difficulty to a combination of factors
including abuse that goes unreported; untimely reporting well
after the incident occurred; witnesses with impaired memory or
communication difficulties, and juries who can be reluctant to
punish a negligent caregiver for causing the premature death of
a person in the last stages of life.209 Nevertheless, according to
another commentator, "[p]rovider anxieties also derive from the
growing perceived threat of criminal prosecutions being
initiated by politically ambitious local prosecutors and states'
Attorneys General." 210
Nursing home provider anxiety might deter negligent
behavior if a few high publicity cases involving negligent
emergency preparedness resulted in prison sentences.
Unfortunately, acquittal may cause an the opposite result. If
nursing home operators successfully defend themselves in cases
where dozens of residents died due to their alleged negligence,
then criminal sanctions will have been shown to be a paper tiger.
Given the difficultly in successfully prosecuting criminal actions
against nursing home owners, criminal sanctions alone should
not be relied upon as the primary methodology for improving
emergency preparedness. Furthermore, in Louisiana, improved
regulation might actually increase the opportunity for successful
prosecution for criminal negligence in the most egregious cases
by creating a statutory violation that can serve as a presumptive
evidence of a gross deviation below the reasonably expected
standard of care.2 11 The regulatory approach has the added, and
more important, advantage of potentially preventing tragedy in
the first place rather than simply relying on indirect, uncertain
deterrence.
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Improving nursing home emergency preparedness regulations is
not an easy task, at least concerning large-area disasters such as
hurricanes. Operators face the dilemma of choosing between
two options, evacuate or stay in place, either of which has
potentially lethal consequences.212 Evacuations are likely to kill a
small percentage of residents during the evacuation and
perhaps, another group from transfer trauma over the weeks
and months following evacuation.2 13 The decision to stay-in-
place can be catastrophically lethal, as in the case of St. Rita's
Nursing Home,214 or cumulatively lethal during the aftermath, as
patients die while conditions degrade, such as in the case of the
Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family.215
Disaster plans should incorporate a rational criterion for
determining when the risks of staying outweigh the risks
inherent in evacuating frail residents.216 Despite the difficulties
caused by this dilemma, maintaining the regulatory status quo is
not an appropriate option after the tragedies caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The federal government and other
states should follow the example of Louisiana and begin to
address the issue, and unlike Louisiana, enact heightened
regulations even if they are opposed by the nursing home
industry.
A seminal study by Barbara Vogt, sponsored by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), that examined
evacuations of nursing homes and other institutions during the
1980s, found that "organizations are not significantly influenced
by policies (either legal or in-house) that require evacuation
plans" and suggested that these organizations had been
"overlooked in the past when planning for low-probability
events." 217 The findings suggest that what nursing homes know
212. See, e.g., Newsnight, supra note 31; Hull & Struck, supra note 65.
213. Supra, notes 24 through 29 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 54 (where thirty-four residents of St. Rita's Nursing Home drowned
after the nursing home administrator's decided not to evacuate).
215. Supra, notes 66 through 69 and accompanying text.
216. Gross, supra note 86.
217. Vogt, supra note 23, at 36-37.
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about emergency preparedness comes from experience learned
from conducting fire drills and information in their disaster
plans rather than contact with emergency management officials
or the FEMA.2 18  Consequently, the burden of resident
evacuation had fallen squarely on operators of nursing homes.219
She concludes that "institutional populations are protected in
emergencies by the adaptiveness of their organizations and not
by formal planning nor by efforts of local communities .... [t]he
fact that organizations adapt to crises is not a new discovery, but
again we find that the planning that can reduce problems in
emergencies has yet to be applied."a0
This seat-of-the-pants approach has been unmasked as
disastrous to nursing home residents in region-wide
emergencies such as hurricanes. One reason is that multiple
national, state, and local authorities all have some part of the
responsibility to ensure that nursing homes are prepared for
emergencies, leading to unclear lines of authority and
accountability. 221 One commentator asserts that the "regulatory
octopus entangling nursing homes has multiple tentacles" made
up of multiple, antagonistic inspectors that each enforce their
own particular set of standards without apparent coordination
or logical consistency, leading nursing home providers to
complain about "inconsistent, unclear, and contradictory
expectations foisted on them." 222 It is time to cut through the
confusion and make it clear that nursing homes will not receive
Medicaid or Medicare funding unless they are in compliance
with basic emergency preparedness requirements. Furthermore,
it is time for the CMS to hold its partners in state agencies who
conduct the annual inspections of nursing homes accountable
for ensuring that nursing homes are prepared for emergencies.
Congress has a number of bills in committee addressing the
218. Id. at 37.
219. Id.
220. Id at vii-viii.
221. Khanna, Olsen, & Hassan, supra note 87.
222. Kapp, supra note 11, at 63.
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issue of emergency preparedness. 223 Perhaps the most helpful is
Senate Bill 1685, which directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security through the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness to
ensure that each State, in its Homeland Security
Strategy or other homeland security plan, provides
detailed and comprehensive information regarding its
pre-disaster and post-disaster plans for the evacuation
of individuals with special needs.. . in emergencies
that would warrant their evacuation, including plans
for the provision of food, water, and shelter for
evacuees. 224
None of the congressional bills, however, call for CMS to
improve its emergency preparedness regulations, nor is one
needed as CMS already has such authority.
The CMS regulation governing emergency preparedness 225
should be amended to include the following requirements. First,
the state agency that inspects nursing homes should be required
to annually submit the emergency preparedness plan for each
nursing home to a national, publicly-accessible database. This
would bring instant transparency to the issue and allow
residents and their families to know the plan and ask probing
questions. Secondly, emergency management should be
223. See, e.g., The Planning for Evacuations of People in Life-Threatening Emergencies
Act, seeks to amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to
require the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure that state and
local emergency preparedness plans "include procedures for evacuating individuals from an
area in preparation for anticipated hazards." H.R. 4258, 109th Cong. (2005); The Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Qualifications act of 2005, seeks to
require that the Department of Homeland Security's Under Secretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response has a background in emergency preparedness and at least four
years of experience. S. 1612, 109th Cong. (2005); The Emergency Preparedness &
Response for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 2005, directs the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security to create the position Disability Coordinator to help
ensure that the needs of people with disabilities are met during emergencies. S. 2124, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 2043 amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act to provide grants for mass evacuation exercises for urban and suburban
areas. S. 2043, 109th Cong. (2005); The American Evacuation Planning Act, directs the
Department of Homeland Security to coordinate with State and local governments to prepare
and improve evacuation plans for communities and individuals with special needs. H.R.
3815, 109th Cong. (2005).
224. S. 1685, 109th Cong. (2005).
225. 42 C.F.R. § 483.75(m) (2005).
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conducted at the state rather than the local level. Three critical
resources, ambulances, air-condition buses, and empty beds at
other long-term care facilities, are in danger of being double or
triple booked if emergency plans are only examined at the local
level.2 6 If a state governmental agency was responsible for
coordinating the allocation of these precious commodities in a
centralized fashion, there may be less scrambling for services in
the time immediately before and after a disaster. Thirdly, there
should be a model emergency evacuation plan for each state that
is tailored for specific geographic threats, such as hurricanes for
the Gulf and East Coasts, tornadoes and ice storms for the
southern Plains, and earthquakes, wildfires, and tsunamis for
the West Coast. State agencies should be required by CMS
regulations to assist nursing homes in tailoring these plans for
their specific needs. Fourthly, the regulations need to recognize
that in some situations, it is safer for residents to stay-in-place
rather than evacuate. Florida recognized this and tried to
require nursing homes to be physically capable of acting as an
emergency shelter by requiring adequate food, water, power,
and structural safety measures.2 27 It is especially important in
locations where the primary dangers to residents are
unpredictable emergencies, such as tornadoes and ice storms
when evacuation may simply not be an option. The specific
circumstances governing the decision to evacuate or stay-in-
place ought to be in the contingency plans in each emergency
plan. Further, the decision ought to ultimately be the call of the
state's centralized nursing home emergency preparedness
center, if they are in command and control of the necessary
resources. Perhaps more controversially, CMS needs to
seriously consider banning reimbursement to nursing homes
that are in inherently unsafe locations unless they are adequately
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 144-154. The biggest problem with nursing home evacuations for
Hurricane Elena was the transportation of residents to shelter in a timely fashion. Wiley P.
Mangum, Jordan I. Kosberg, & Peg McDonald, Hurricane Elena and Pinellas County,
Florida: Some Lessons Learned from the Largest Evacuation of Nursing Home Patients in
History, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 388 (1989).
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prepared to protect residents from the danger. Fifthly, the
regulations need to hold nursing homes accountable for
compliance with their emergency plans, yet also allow for some
flexibility when the plan simply falls apart. The focus should be
on regulatory punishment for the failure to plan and train,228 not
punishment for situations beyond the control of the nursing
home. Sixthly, in the case of evacuation, nursing homes should
be required to send residents with staff, when possible, food,
water, medical records, and necessary medications. Continuity
of care between staff and residents is important229 and may
result in less transfer trauma. Finally, nursing homes should
continue to be held accountable for adequate fire safety. The
regulations2M need to hold nursing homes accountable to the
most recent Life Safety Code, which include mandatory fire
sprinklers in all nursing homes. 231 They also need to continue to
emphasize fire drills. The goal should be to improve
preparedness for natural disaster response by nursing homes,
not to switch the focus from fire safety to disaster planning.
These recommendations are likely to be expensive, both
financially and in terms of the political capital necessary for
realigning agency turf and responsibility. Yet, the expense of
not adequately regulating nursing homes to require adequate
emergency planning is shifted to residents and the people who
love them when low-probability, high-damage disasters occur.
Simply gambling and hoping that disasters will not happen
guarantees that resident safety is a lost cause.
CONCLUSION
Improved emergency preparedness regulation may significantly
decrease injury and death among residents of nursing homes
when the next disaster occurs. Nevertheless, University of
228. See Underwood, supra note 21.
229. Vogt, supra note 23, at 24.
230. 42 C.F.R. § 483.70 (2005).
231. Underwood, supra note 21.
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Minnesota Public Health Professor Rosalie Kane wisely reminds
the public that it is important not to make high quality
evacuation plans "the be-all and end-all of how we judge
nursing homes" but rather "the choice of a nursing home should
still be on verities like quality, quantity and caring nature of the
staff and what it would be like to live there."232 Improved
emergency preparedness will help good nursing homes, like St.
Rita's Nursing Home, remain good and safe places to live.
232. Gross, supra note 86.
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